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In 1963, the Supreme Court of the United States decided in Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), that the sixth amendment right to
counsel is a fundamental right, applicable to the states through the four-
teenth amendment's due process clause and that "any person haled into
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured of a fair trial
unless counsel is provided for him."' Since then, innumerable courts have
* Former Associate Editor, University of Miami Law Review. Presently Law Clerk to
the Chief Judge of the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Judge
Charles B. Fulton.
This article does not in any way reflect the opinions or attitudes of Judge Fulton.
1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
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attempted to determine just how far this Supreme Court decision extends.
Are the states required to inform the accused of his right to the aid of
counsel and appoint a lawyer to represent him if he is indigent, where the
accused is charged with a "petty offense," a traffic offense, or a misde-
meanor? Is the sixth amendment right to counsel less than absolute? If
so, where must the line be drawn, and on what basis? Two United States
Circuit Courts of Appeal have arrived at somewhat different conclusions
in resolving this issue.2 The various federal district and state courts' de-
velopment of the question is as diverse as the states in which they sit.8
I. BEFORE GIDEON-HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND
ITS APPLICATION TO THE STATES
The sixth amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
4
This guarantee was construed to mean that in federal courts counsel
must be provided, unless intelligently waived, for defendants unable to
employ counsel,5 and prior to Gideon," the sixth amendment's right to
counsel was held inapplicable to the states.7 The right, however, was ex-
tended to some of those accused in state courts under the fourteenth
amendment's guarantee of due process of the law, without reference to
the sixth amendment. In Powell v. Alabama, young, uneducated Black
men were hurried to trial for the rape of a White woman, a capital
offense, without the effective aid of counsel, even though appointment of
a lawyer was required by state law.8 The United States Supreme Court,
in reviewing the case, held:
[I]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ
counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense
because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the like,
it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign
counsel for him as a necessary prerequisite of due process of
law.... (Emphasis added.)"
The Court in Powell extended the right to counsel to indigents accused
by the state of capital crimes. Subsequently, the issue became whether
this right would be extended to those accused of non-capital crimes.
2. Compare Beck v. Winters, 407 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1969) with James v. Headley, 410
F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1969) and Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965).
3. See section VII (C) infra.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
5. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
6. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
7. CI. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
8. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
9. Id. at 71.
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In Betts v. Brady10 the Supreme Court resolved this issue by creating
the "special circumstances" rule. The Betts court held that the appoint-
ment of counsel would be required in federal court trials and in those
state trials where "special circumstances" existed which could operate to
deny a fair trial under the due process clause." This rule was criticized
by legal commentators, 2 and in 1963, it was expressly overruled in
Gideon v. Wainwright.3
Gideon was charged with entering a poolroom with the intent to
commit a misdemeanor, which was considered a felony under Florida law.
The Gideon court held the right to counsel to be "fundamental" to a fair
trial, in applying it to Gideon's conviction; however, since Gideon, courts
have wrestled with the problems arising from the application of the
decision. Precisely how fundamental is the right? Some courts have held
Gideon applicable only to felons, for Gideon was charged with a felony.
Others have held the decision to be absolute-applicable to all criminal
cases-because there is no language in Gideon distinguishing felonies
from non-felonies. Other courts have arrived at yet different conclusions. 4
Words can be gleaned from Gideon to support the view that it is
applicable to all criminal cases including petty offenses and misdemean-
ors. 5 On the other hand, the defendant Gideon was an accused felon,
and thus, the decision could logically be limited to apply only to felony
cases.
II. THE RIGHT OF AN ACCUSED NON-FELON TO HIRE COUNSEL
Although it may seem incredible to some that the right to have one's
own lawyer represent him could be questioned, it has been questioned in
at least one case. In Decker v. State, 113 Ohio St. 512, 150 N.E. 74
(1925), the Ohio court held that accused persons have the right to retain
counsel, and today there seems little question that there is a clear right
to be represented by one's personally retained counsel. 6 Thus, the prob-
lem of whether there is a right to counsel in non-felony cases only arises
when a defendant is too poor to hire his own lawyer. If the accused is
financially able to hire an attorney, the right to do so will not be denied.
10. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
11. Id. at 461-62.
12. See generally J. MEADOR, PRELUDES TO GIDEON (1967).
13. 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963).
14. See section VII, infra.
15. [A~ny person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be as-
sured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him .... The right of one charged
with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental ... in some countries, but it
is in ours. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
16. Annot., 42 A.L.R. 1157 (1926) (constitutional right to appear by counsel); 21 Am.




III. THE PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS Or GRANTING
AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The real practical issues behind this controversy are implementation
and cost. For example, the Arkansas Supreme Court, in deciding that an
accused charged with a misdemeanor is not entitled to counsel, com-
mented upon the difficulties of implementing such a program:
Practical considerations must enter into these policy determina-
tions.... [I] t must be recognized that the right to counsel is not
an end in itself, but a means for achieving the most perfect
justice possible in a given situation, which requires the striking
of a balance between an ideal situation and what is humanly
possible to achieve. Practical consideration of the impact of ap-
plication of abstract constitutional principles ... is not without
precedent....
The practical impossibility of implementing a system [of
appointed counsel for accused misdemeanants] .. .is obvious
when we consider that there are more justices of the peace in
Arkansas than there are resident practicing lawyers and that
there are counties in which there are no practicing lawyers. The
impact of such a rule would seriously impair the administration
of justice in Arkansas and impose an intolerable burden upon
the legal profession."
In People v. Letterio, the New York appellate court said:
We point out that the practical result of assigning counsel to de-
fendants in traffic cases would be chaotic. Assigning counsel in
but 1% of these cases could require the services of nearly half
the attorneys registered in the state.18
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 1965 decision,19 commented that
even if the court were to require the appointment of counsel in every
criminal offense, there may not be enough lawyers available to appoint.
"In Jacksonville, Florida... over 1,100 persons are charged in Municipal
Court during an average week with non-felony offenses .. . [and] 60%
are for traffic violations. There are less than 600 active members of the
Jacksonville bar."'
On the other hand, without comment upon the number of lawyers
available for appointment, the Oregon Supreme Court found that the cost
of granting an absolute right to counsel would be minor:
We are not persuaded by the argument that the cost of pro-
viding counsel for indigent misdemeanants will be burdensome.
17. Cableton v. State, 243 Ark. 351, 357-58, 420 S.W.2d 534, 538-39 (1967).
18. 16 N.Y.2d 307, 312, 213 N.E.2d 670, 672, 266 N.Y.S.2d 368, 370 (Ct. of App. 1965).
19. McDonald v. Moore, 353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965). See Brinson v. Florida, 273 F.
Supp. 840 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
20. McDonald v. Moore, 353 F.2d 106, 109 n.3 (5th Cir. 1965).
19711
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See Aschenbrenner and Belt, Cost Study: The Defense of In-
digents in Misdemeanor Cases in Oregon, Feb. 14, 1967. That
study indicates that the cost of providing counsel to indigent
misdemeanants in Oregon will amount to about $300,000 or
about one-twentieth of the amount received annually from fines.
... We think the estimated amount is a modest fee for guaran-
teeing a fair trial in all criminal prosecutions.2'
In Mississippi, the Federal District Court for the Northern District, held
that the failure of the state legislature to provide compensation for ap-
pointed lawyers in non-felony cases could not cause the court to limit
constitutional guarantees. 22 The court warned that continued "local in-
ertia" would bring prosecutions of misdemeanors to a "grinding halt."
IV. FELONIES, MISDEMEANORS, AND PETTY CRIMES-THE
PROBLEM OF DEFINITIONS
One of the problems which has grown out of the Gideon case 3 is the
problem of definitions. Gideon was convicted of a felony; thus, at the very
least, the Gideon decision is applicable to accused felons. However,
whether a crime is a felony or a misdemeanor has little or nothing to do
with the nature of the criminal act-it depends upon the "character of
the punishment" provided by the statute defining the crime. 24 "The dis-
tinction now commonly adopted, frequently by statute, is that offenses
punishable by death, or by imprisonment in the state prison or peniten-
tiary, are felonies; whereas, all others, including those punishable in the
county jail, are misdemeanors."
25
In Iowa, bribery in an athletic contest was held to be a misdemeanor,
even though the maximum penalty was ten years' imprisonment.20 Under
Arkansas law, some misdemeanors are punishable by up to three years in
jail.2 On the other hand, in Minnesota, a misdemeanor is punishable by
no more than 90 days in jail or a $100 fine.2"
In McDonald v. Moore, the circuit court noted that misdemeanors
under Florida law may be punishable by up to seven years; whereas,
some felonies carry a maximum penalty of a little over a year. Com-
menting upon the incongruous results which could arise in creating a
21. Application of Stevenson, 458 P.2d 414 (Ore. 1969). See also Minnesota v. Borst, 278
Minn. 388, 154 N.W.2d 888 (1967).
22. Phillips v. Cole, 298 F. Supp. 1049, 1053 (N.D. Miss. 1968). See Colon v. Hendry,
408 F.2d 864, 866 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Bramlett v. Peterson, 307 F. Supp. 1311, 1316 (M.D. Fla.
1969); Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 819 (1968) (right of compensation to appointed attorneys in
absence of state statute).
23. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
24. 2 Am. Jug. 2d Criminal Law § 19 (1965).
25. Id.
26. State v. Di Paglia, 247 Iowa 79, 71 N.W.2d 601 (1955).
27. Winters v. Beck, 385 U.S. 907, n.1 (1966). See Brinson v. Florida, 273 F. Supp. 840,
846 (S.D. Fla. 1967); People v. Mallory, 378 Mich. 538, 147 N.W,2d 66 (1967).
28. MINN. STAT. § 609.02(3) (1969).
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simple felony-misdemeanor rule applicable to a system such as Florida's,
the court said:
We do not think it can be said that counsel must be appointed
in all felony cases but not in any misdemeanor cases. We were
informed by counsel for the State of Florida that one or more
crimes, designated as misdemeanors under the Florida law, may
be punished for as long as seven years. It can scarcely be said
that a person charged with having committed such a misde-
meanor would not be deprived of a fundamental right if denied
the service of counsel, where the right to counsel is guaranteed
to one charged with a felony for which the punishment may be
no more than a year and a day.
29
This labeling problem was also recognized by the federal district court in
Brinson v. Florida, where the court said:
A definitional problem exists from one state to another state in
labeling of the same offense. What is termed a felony in one
state is called a misdemeanor in another. Thus, in some states
such as Florida and Arizona, adultery is classed as a felony, but
as a misdemeanor in other states such as Kansas .... Further
illustrating the problem created by an arbitrary felony-misde-
meanor classification is that even though a crime be classed as a
felony or as a misdemeanor in all states, the possible punish-
ment varies greatly from state to state .... Under modern leg-
islation many so-called misdemeanors are more dangerous to life
and limb than some felonies .... It therefore appears that the
state's characterization of its criminal offenses cannot serve as a
valid cut-off point when the right to assigned counsel [is con-
sidered] .0
It seems incredible to this writer that the question of whether a crime
is a misdemeanor or a felony depends upon the label given it by the state
legislature and that that label can be used to delimit fundamental con-
stitutional rights. Such a system is entirely too arbitrary.
The distinction between felonies and misdemeanors based upon the
jail in which the accused may be imprisoned is not universally followed,
however. Title 18 of the UNITED STATES CODE, section 1, defines the terms
felony, misdemeanor, and petty offense in accord with the maximum term
of imprisonment:
(1) Any offense punishable by death or imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year is a felony.
(2) Any other offense is a misdemeanor.
(3) Any misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed
imprisonment for a period of six months or a fine of not more
than $500, or both, is a petty offense.
29. McDonald v. Moore, 353 F.2d 106, 108 (5th Cir. 1965).
30. Brinson v. Florida, 273 F. Supp. 840, 846 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
1971]
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Assuming arguendo that the sixth amendment right to counsel is less than
absolute, it seems far more rational to base the denial or granting of ap-
pointed counsel to an indigent accused upon the maximum time his liberty
may be lost than upon the legislative categorization of the act of which
he is accused.
For example, whether an accused is entitled, under the constitution,
to a jury trial is based upon the maximum penalty to which the accused
is subject-not upon the category of crime, as defined by the state, with
which the defendant is charged. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968). Petty offenders are not entitled to a trial by jury; a "petty of-
fense" is one punishable by no more than six months in jail or a $500 fine
or both.8'
Title 18 U.S.C., section 3006A, provides for compensation for counsel
appointed to represent indigents accused of felonies or misdemeanors, as
defined in section one of that title; however, petty offenders are not
permitted compensated counsel. Apparently, section 3006A does not mean
that the sixth amendment right to counsel is inapplicable to petty fed-
eral offenses; it simply means that counsel appointed to such cases will not
be compensated under the Criminal Justice Act. 2
V. CAN THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL BE
ANALOGIZED TO THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL?
The petty-non-petty standard, now applicable to the sixth amend-
ment's right to a trial by jury, has been urged by some to be equally
applicable to the right to counsel. The Fifth Circuit laid this argument to
rest, however, in its circuit. In James v. Headley,8 the court held:
The appellee erred in equating the right of trial by jury to the
right to counsel. Because a charge is petty enough to lie out-
side the jury-trial requirement does not mean that it is also
petty enough to allow suspension of the right to counsel. The
petty-offense exception has not been applied uniformly to all
Sixth Amendment rights [citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257
(1948) (right to a public trial)]....
The right to a lawyer's advice is peculiarly important in
an accusatorial legal system such as ours. The elaborate defen-
sive weapons courts and legislatures have fashioned for the indi-
vidual are valueless if he lacks the understanding to use them.
31. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Dyke v. Taylor Instrument, 391 U.S.
216 (1968); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968) ; Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
32. CONF. REP. No. 1709, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 3000 (1964). See James v. Headley, 410
F.2d 325, 330 (5th Cir. 1969); FED. R. CRIM. P. 44. Recently, the Criminal Justice Act, 18
U.S.C. § 3006(A) (1964), was amended by Act of October 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-447 to
permit federal district courts to establish federal public defenders for accused felons and
misdemeanants.
33. 410 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1969).
[Vol. XXV
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The more fundamental nature of the right to counsel is
also reflected in the fact that Gideon has been applied retroac-
tively, while Duncan and Bloom, encompassing the right to jury
trial, have not been so applied. 4
The Supreme Courts of Minnesota and Oregon have analyzed the pro-
posed equation of the right to a trial by jury and the right to counsel in
similar ways. 5 The Minnesota court said, "[E] ven though the two rights
derive from the same provisions of our Federal Constitution, they are not
of equal significance when it comes to the matter of obtaining a fair
trial." 36 In summary, it would seem the two rights cannot be equated, for
the right to a lawyer's aid would appear more basic to a fair trial than the
right to be tried by a jury.
VI. UNDER THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT COUNSEL
Is NOT PROVIDED TO "PETTY OFFENDERS"-WHY SHOULD
THE STATES BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY?
Title 18, UNITED STATES CODE Section 1 defines "petty offenders" as
those charged with crimes carrying penalties of no more than six months
or $500 or both. And Section 3006A makes provision for compensation
to lawyers appointed to represent indigents. However, this section does
not include within its scope counsel for petty offenders.17 This does not
mean, however, that counsel is not provided to indigents charged with
petty crimes-it means only that they are not given compensated coun-
sel.3 Rule 44, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (1968), reads as
follows:
Right to assigned counsel.
Every defendant who is unable to obtain counsel shall be en-
titled to have counsel assigned .... (emphasis added).
The Advisory Committee's notes on this Rule indicate that the intent was
to broaden the right to counsel, extending it to petty offenders and to non-
indigents who for other reasons are unable to retain counsel, 9 even
though these appointed lawyers would not be paid. Thus, the absolute
right to counsel has been extended in the federal courts. In those districts
and circuits which have required the states to grant counsel to indigent
misdemeanants or petty offenders, the federal courts are not requiring of
the states anything more than is required in the federal system.
34. Id. at 331-33. See also Goslin v. Thomas, 400 F.2d 594, 597-98 (5th Cir. 1968).
35. Application of Stevenson, 254 Ore. 195 458 P.2d 414 (1969) ; State v. Borst, 278 Minn.
388, 154 N.W.2d 888 (1967). See State ex rel Argensinger v. Hamlin, 236 So.2d 442 (Fla.
1970).
36. State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 398, 154 N.W.2d 888, 894 (1967).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b) (1964).
38. FED. R. CRim. P. 44; James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1969). But see Beck
v. Winters, 407 F.2d 125, 130 n.13 (8th Cir. 1969); Brinson v. Florida, 273 F. Supp. 840
(S.D. Fla. 1967). See also Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
39. Reiterated in James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1969).
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VII. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN THE
VARIOUS JURISDICTIONS-AN INCONCLUSIVE MAZE
A. Circuit Courts of Appeals
1. EIGHTH CIRCUIT
In 1968, the Federal Court of the Eastern District of Arkansas
granted a habeas corpus petition to a petitioner who had been convicted,
without the aid of counsel, of obscene and lascivious conduct, a misde-
meanor.' The ground for the petition was that the denial of assistance
of counsel was a denial of the petitioner's sixth amendment right to coun-
sel. On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the district court was upheld.41 The
circuit court held that the sixth amendment does not differentiate between
misdemeanors and felonies-"all criminal prosecutions" are included in
the amendment. But the court did not make the right to counsel as ab-
solute as the amendment's language. The court said: "[W]e find it un-
necessary to decide that all indigents have the right to assistance of
counsel in all misdemeanor prosecutions. ... " Granting or denying the
right to appointed counsel merely on the basis of the crime's label-mis-
demeanor or felony-was expressly disapproved. (Some Arkansas misde-
meanors are punishable by up to three year's imprisonment.) The eighth
circuit suggested a six-month standard by citing Brinson v. Florida, 273
F. Supp. 840 (S.D. Fla. 1960) (6 month/$500 standard) and 18 U.S.C.
section 3006A (Criminal Justice Act)."'
2. FIFTH CIRCUIT
In 1965, in Harvey v. Mississippi, a panel of Fifth Circuit judges
reversed a Mississippi federal district court which had denied Clyde
Harvey, an impoverished, unschooled Black farmer, his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. Harvey had been sentenced, without the aid of a
lawyer, to ninety days in jail and fined five hundred dollars for possessing
whiskey in violation of Mississippi law." The court held:
[T]he right to the assistance of counsel when entering a plea
applies in state as well as federal tribunals is firmly established.
Waiver of such right to counsel cannot be presumed from
the mere fact that the accused appeared without counsel or
failed to request counsel....
It is true that the cases which support appellant's argument
all involved felony convictions, but their rationale does not seem
40. Winters v. Beck, 281 F. Supp. 793 (E.D. Ark. 1968).
41. Beck v. Winters, 407 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1969), aff'g, 281 F. Supp. 793 (E.D. Ark.
1968).
42. Id. at 130.
43. Id. at 130 n.13.
44. Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263 (Sth Cir. 1965).
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to depend on the often purely formal distinction between felonies
and misdemeanors. One accused of crime has the right to assis-
tance of counsel before entering a plea because of the disadvan-
tageous position of an unassisted layman in a court of law and
because of the serious consequences which may attend a guilty
plea. Such disadvantages and consequences may weigh as heavily
on an accused misdemeanant as on an accused felon.45
McDonald v. Moore4" was decided by the Fifth Circuit shortly after
the Harvey case. Again the Fifth Circuit reversed a district court's denial
of a misdemeanant's petition for writ of habeas corpus on the ground that
the right to aid of counsel could not be arbitrarily denied all indigent
non-felons. In this case, the petitioner was sentenced to six months in jail
or a fine of $250 for each of the two misdemeanors of which she was con-
victed. The court noted the practical difficulties in effectuating a rule
granting counsel to those indigents charged with misdemeanors but found
itself bound by-Harvey v. Mississippi, which granted a writ of habeas
corpus to a convicted misdemeanant because he was convicted without
the benefit of counsel.4
Affirming a Louisiana federal district court, 8 the fifth circuit said
in Goslin v. Thomas:
Whatever may be the eventual interpretation of the Gideon
decision, it is clear that this circuit has adopted the broad view
with respect to the rights to counsel in misdemeanor cases.4"
In Goslin, the petitioner had been sentenced to the maximum penalty for
the misdemeanor of escape-one year.
Then, in October of 1968, Judge Brown, Chief Justice of the Fifth
Circuit, took a different approach to the problem ° In Boyer v. Orlando,
the fifth circuit reversed the Florida district court, which had granted a
writ of habeas corpus on the basis of Harvey, McDonald, and Goslin.
The basis for the reversal was that the petitioner had failed to "exhaust
available state remedies," a requirement of 28 U.S.C. section 2254(b)
(habeas corpus petitions by those in state custody). Because of what at
that time was Florida's rigid position denying the right to counsel to
those accused of misdemeanors, regardless of the potential jail term,51
the district court had not required the usual "exhaustion," reasoning that
appeals to the Florida courts on this issue would be futile. Judge Brown,
ignoring Harvey, Goslin, and McDonald, said that "[t] oo much has gone
45. Id. at 268-69.
46. 353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965).
47. McDonald v. Moore, 353 F.2d 106, 109 n.3 (5th Cir. 1965).
48. In re Thomas, 261 F. Supp. 263 (W.D. La. 1966).
49. Goslin v. Thomas, 400 F.2d 594, 597 (5th Cir. 1968).
50. Boyer v. Orlando, 402 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1968).
51. E.g., Watkins v. Morris, 179 So.2d 348 (Fla. 1965); Fish v. State, 159 So.2d 866
(Fla. 1964). This rule was somewhat modified in State ex rel. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 236
So.2d 442 (Fla. 1970). See notes 131, 132 infra and accompanying text.
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over the dam . . . to assume that the Florida Supreme Court will per-
versely adhere to their decisions . . .,52
In 1969, the fifth circuit reaffirmed its earlier decisions in a number
of cases." In James v. Headley, the court reversed the district court which
had denied petitions for writs of habeas corpus to two petitioners who
were convicted, without the assistance of counsel, of various misdemean-
ors. The court said, "the right to counsel, as articulated in Harvey, is
alive and well and living in this circuit. . . .. 5' Although none of the
offenses with which the petitioners were charged carried a maximum
penalty of more than 60 days, the petitioners were sentenced to 600 and
240 days respectively (cumulating all the sentences and counting days
served in lieu of a fine).5 The circuit court held that the charges could
not be considered separately for purposes of calculating the possible sen-
tence in determining the right to counsel .5  The case presented an ideal
opportunity for the court to articulate just how absolutely the Harvey
decision would be applied; however, because of apparent disagreement
among the judges on the panel, this was not done.57 The writer of the
Headley opinion, Judge Wisdom, said:
Judges Godbold and Simpson would rest the holding squarely on
Harvey. The author of this opinion would go further. I start
with the general principle that the Sixth Amendment establishes
the right to counsel in "all criminal prosecutions." There is,
therefore, no constitutional distinction between felonies and
misdemeanors, between gross and petty offenses, between the
loss of liberty for 181 days ... or fewer days....
I take the position that regardless of labels, an offense is
serious enough to require appointment of counsel if it may result
in the loss of liberty for any period of time."8
The flow of right-to-counsel-cases from the Fifth Circuit continued into
1970.11 Both Shepherd v. Jordan° and Matthews v. Florida"' established
52. Boyer v. Orlando, 402 F.2d 966, 967 (5th Cir. 1968). See note 127 infra and accom-
panying text.
53. Bohr v. Purdy, 412 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1969) ; James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325 (5th
Cir. 1969) ; Colon v. Hendry, 408 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1969).
54. James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325, 326, 327 (5th Cir. 1969). See generally Note, James
v. Headley: Right to Counsel for Petty Offenses, 3 GA. L. REv. 750 (1969); Note, Mis-
demeanant's Right to Counsel: Imprisonment Standard, 21 U. FLA. L. REV. 421 (1969).
55. The United States Supreme Court has recently held that where additional time in
jail is imposed in lieu of a fine or costs which the defendant has been unable to pay, the
additional time cannot bring the sentence over the maximum term permitted by the statute
or ordinance. William v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970). See also Tate v. Short, 91 S. Ct. 668
(1971).
56. James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325, 327 (5th Cir. 1969).
57. Id. at 333-34.
58. Id.
59. Wooley v. Consolidated City of Jacksonville, 433 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1970) ; Shepherd
v. Jordan, 425 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1970); Matthews v. Florida, 422 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir.
1970) ; Capler v. City of Greenville, 422 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1970).
60. 425 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1970).
61. 422 F.2d 1046 (Sth Cir. 1970).
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the manner in which maximum sentences would be calculated. The Mat-
thews court said:
In computing the total potential penalty which may be imposed
on a defendant, we suggest that the trial court not only consider
the maximum possible sentence and fine under each charge, but
also any additional sentence which might be imposed if the fine
is not paid .... [T]his procedure gives a much more accurate
representation of the gravity of the charges facing the defendant
-especially an indigent defendant.
62
That the court began to draw rules under which maximum sentences are
to be counted indicates that the court does not intend to grant an absolute
right to counsel, nor even a right whenever any incarceration is possible.
If either of these rules were adopted, there would seem to be no need to
establish a way in which to compute sentences. In Shepherd v. Jordan,
the court, presented with the question of right to counsel in non-felony
cases, cited Duncan v. Louisiana,3 a right to jury trial case which holds
that those charged with "petty offenses" carrying a penalty of six months
or under, would not be entitled to a trial by jury. The panel concluded
that: "this Court can only say that the Sixth Amendment speaks to all
criminal prosecutions, saving petty offenses which have been court ex-
cepted from its stricture. '6 4 Without knowledge of prior cases decided
by this circuit court, this statement would seem to establish a six-month/
petty offense rule. Perhaps it could be said that this case receded from
the Harvey v. Mississippi's 90-day rule. However, in October, 1970, the
same court affirmed a district court opinion which held that an accused
has the right to counsel if the potential penalty could amount to impris-
onment of as much as ninety days or a fine of $500.5
To date, the rule in the Fifth Circuit is unclear. Apparently persons
subject to a potential penalty of 90 days in jail have the right to assigned
counsel. In Patterson v. Purdy, a writ of habeas corpus was granted to
petitioner Patterson, who had been found guilty in the state court of oper-
ating a motor vehicle without a valid driver's license and sentenced to a
total potential term of 47 days without benefit of counsel.66 This de-
cision is, at this writing, being appealed to the fifth circuit; hopefully, it
may result in the establishment of guidelines for the district courts within
the circuit.
B. Supreme Court of the United States
The Supreme Court, in 1966 and 1967, was presented with the oppor-
tunity to rule on the question of the sixth amendment right to counsel of
62. Id. at 1049.
63. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
64. Shepherd v. Jordan, 425 F.2d 1174, 1176 (5th Cir. 1970).
65. Wooley v. Consolidated City of Jacksonville, 433 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1970).
66. Patterson v. Purdy, Case No. 69-957-Civ-JE (S.D. Fla., filed Oct. 1, 1970).
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petty offenders, but the Court declined to hear the case.67 In Winters v.
Beck,"' which came to the Court from the Arkansas Supreme Court, Jus-
tices Stewart and Black dissented from the Court's denial of the petition
for a writ of certiorari, because of the conflict between the Arkansas court
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Mr. Justice
Black said:
No State should be permitted to repudiate [the words of Gideon]
by arbitrarily attaching the label "misdemeanor" to a criminal
offense.... I do suggest that the answer cannot be made to de-
pend upon artificial or arbitrary labels of "felony" or "misde-
meanor" attached ... by 50 different States .... [I]t is at least
our duty to see to it that a vital guarantee of the United States
Constitution is accorded an even hand in all the States.69
It has been suggested by some that the case of In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1 (1967), which concerned the application of due process to juvenile
delinquency proceedings, has indicated the Supreme Court's position with
respect to the right of counsel. It is said that the language in Gault clearly
limits the application of Gideon to felonies or to serious offenses. 7 The
Court, in Gault, said:
[The juvenile] would be entitled to clear advice that he could be
represented by counsel, and, at least if a felony were involved,
the State would be required to provide counsel if his parents
were unable to afford it.
71
At another point in the Gault decision, the Court speaks of the right to
counsel as if it were based on the seriousness of the charge involved.72
Thus far, however, much of the law in this area has been made in
a single circuit-the fifth-and the district courts within that circuit.
Eventually the Supreme Court will resolve the problem, probably when
it is presented with a clearer conflict between circuits than presently exists.
C. The States
78
After trying to find a rule from the many cases deciding the issue of
a non-felon's right to counsel, the Minnesota Supreme Court said:
[W] e can obtain no definite rule from the cases that have con-
sidered this question. There is no unanimity either in classifica-
67. Heller v. Connecticut, 389 U.S. 902 (1967) ; Winters v. Beck, 385 U.S. 907 (1966)
Dejoseph v. Connecticut, 385 U.S. 982 (1966).
68. 385 U.S. 907 (1966).
69. Id.
70. State ex rel. Plutshack v. State Dept. of Health & Soc. Serv., 37 Wis. 2d 713, 155
N.W.2d 549 (1969); State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 154 N.W.2d 888 (1967); Brinson v.
Florida, 269 F. Supp. 747 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
71. In re Gault, 387 US. 1, 29 (1967).
72. Id. at 42.
73. Although this listing or summary is not intended to be all-inclusive, it does present
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tion of cases as misdemeanors or in the conclusions that have
been reached or the reasons for such conclusions.74
That this is so will be evidenced by the following:
1. ARIZONA
Arizona has established a "serious offense" rule in determining which
of those indigent persons accused of non-felonies are entitled to appointed
counsel. In a 1964 case, 5 the Arizona Supreme Court found that an indi-
gent defendant was illegally sentenced for a misdemeanor-assisting the
escape of a convicted felon-because he was not accorded the aid of a
court-appointed lawyer. The court found that any misdemeanor which is a
"serious offense" carries with it the right to counsel. Whether an accused
has been charged with a "serious offense" is determined by the nature of
the offense, the extent of the potential penalty, and the complexity of the
case. Then, in 1969, the Arizona court drew a mandatory dividing line at
six months or $500.76 All cases wherein the accused could suffer a jail
term of six months or more would carry the right to a lawyer's assistance.
Further, the court established a permissive rule for cases carrying a pen-
alty of less than six months. If the case is "serious" enough, the right may
be accorded even though the offense is punishable by less than six months
or $500; this determination would be made by the trial court in its
discretion.
2. ARKANSAS
There is an apparent conflict between the eighth circuit, which in-
cludes the state of Arkansas, and the Arkansas Supreme Court. In Cable-
ton v. State," the Arkansas court held that defendants charged with mis-
demeanors, regardless of the possible jail sentence, would not be entitled to
counsel appointed by the court, for Arkansas law required appointed
counsel only in felony cases. In reaching its decision, the court said that
the United States Supreme Court had not yet decided the issue, and it
would not try to anticipate what the Court would eventually do.78 The
Cableton court, however, was clearly influenced by practical considera-
tions. "The impact of [deciding otherwise] would seriously impair the
administration of justice in Arkansas and impose an intolerable burden
upon the legal profession." 9
the majority of state court published opinions on this issue. For an excellent analysis of the
various states' holdings, see State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 154 N.W.2d 888 (1967).
74. State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 396, 154 N.W.2d 888, 893 (1967).
75. State v. Anderson, 96 Ariz. 123, 392 P.2d 784 (1964). Cf. State v. Reager, 103 Ariz.
287, 440 P.2d 907 (1968).
76. Burrage v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 53, 459 P.2d 313 (1969).
77. 243 Ark. 351, 420 S.W.2d 534 (1967). Cf. Winters v. Beck, 385 U.S. 907 (1966);
Beck v. Winters, 407 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1969), aff'g, 281 F. Supp. 793 (E.D. Ark. 1968).
78. Cableton v. State, 243 Ark. 351, 420 S.W.2d 534 (1967).
79. Id. at 538, 420 S.W.2d at 538-39.
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On the other hand, the eighth circuit held that the sixth amendment
does not differentiate between felonies and misdemeanors, granting a
petition for writ of habeas corpus to one sentenced to 30 days in jail and
a $250 fine for obscene and lascivious conduct."0 In spite of this holding,
however, the eighth circuit seems to have spelled out a six-months or $500
general rule for granting counsel to indigents.
3. CALIFORNIA
The "rule" in California is clear-the right to the assistance of a
lawyer applies to all cases, including those crimes labeled misdemeanors,
if the accused is susceptible to loss of liberty."' The California courts
have based their holdings, for the most part, upon the state constitution,
which provides that "in criminal prosecutions, in any court whatever, the
party accused shall have the right . . . to appear and defend in person
and with counsel."8 2 Traffic cases, however, have been construed to be
non-criminal. Thus, it was held in Fallis v. Department of Motor
Vehicles 3 that the sixth amendment right to counsel does not apply to
traffic cases. However, the court did find a constitutional basis for the
right in non-criminal proceedings in the due process clause of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments and the fourteenth amendment's equal pro-
tection clause-but the right to the assistance of counsel could not, in
these cases, be accorded absolutely. 4
4. CONNECTICUT
The Federal District Court sitting in Connecticut used a "special
circumstances" test for determining whether counsel was to be afforded
an indigent accused of the misdemeanor of non-support and sentenced
to a year in jail. 5 The court discussed Gideon, and found nothing in it to
limit its effect to felonies. The court said:
[I] t would be a gross perversion of solid constitutional doctrine
to find a rational distinction between one year in jail (a mis-
demeanor) and one year and a day in prison (a felony) ....
The Fifth Circuit has unhesitatingly refused to draw the line
even at prosecutions resulting in six month and ninety day
internments.86
80. Beck v. Winters, 407 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1969).
81. E.g., In re Lopez, 2 Cal.3d 141, 465 P.2d 257, 84 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970) ; In re Render,
271 Cal. App. 2d 423, 76 Cal. Rptr. 522 (1969) ; In re Smiley, 66 Cal. 2d 606, 427 P.2d 179,
58 Cal. Rptr. 579 (1967); Blake v. Municipal Court, 242 Cal. App. 2d 731, 51 Cal. Rptr.
771 (1966) ; In re Johnson, 62 Cal. 2d 325, 398 P.2d 420, 42 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1965) ; Ex parte
Masching, 41 Cal. 2d 530, 261 P.2d 251 (1953).
82. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13 (emphasis added).
83. 264 Cal. App. 2d 373, 70 Cal. Rptr. 595 (1968).
84. Id. at 386, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
85. Arbo v. Hegstrom, 261 F. Supp. 397 (D. Conn. 1966).
86. Id. at 401.
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In spite of this language, however, the court found it necessary to extend
Gideon and instead based its holding in favor of the petitioner upon the
"special circumstances" test (petitioner's inability to fend for himself)
and the fact that there appeared to be an unasserted double jeopardy
defense available to the petitioner which a lawyer would have recognized.
5. LOUISIANA
Louisiana apparently does not afford appointed attorneys to in-
digents accused of criminal offenses where the offenses are misdemeanors,
regardless of the potential sentence. 7 In a 1968 case, State v. Rockey-
more, the Louisiana Supreme Court said:
Although it appears that the defendant had no attorney at the
time of trial . . . [t]he United States Supreme Court has not
held that an accused is entitled to counsel in a misdemeanor
case....
[A]nd [i]t has never been the law of this state that a person
charged with a misdemeanor is entitled as a matter of right
to court-appointed counsel. 8
The defendant in the Rockeymore case was sentenced to one year in jail
after being found guilty of attempted theft, a misdemeanor. Louisiana
is one of the states within the fifth circuit; thus, the state's position is
contrary to and conflicts with the position of its federal court of ap-
peals. 9
6. MASSACHUSETTS
Citing Gideon v. Wainwright, a Massachusetts court held in 1966
that where the proceedings were sufficiently serious to result in confine-
ment of the accused, he must be given the right to counsel, and the court
must appoint a lawyer to represent him if he cannot afford his own.9°
7. MICHIGAN
The defendant Mallory was convicted of a misdemeanor, receiving
and concealing stolen goods valued under $100, without the assistance of
counsel. A justice of the peace court sentenced him to 90 days. The
defendant was on parole, and upon conviction for the misdemeanor, his
parole was revoked. The defendant had not been granted a court-
appointed lawyer because his crime was classified as a misdemeanor. In
87. E.g., State v. Rockeymore, 253 La. 101, 216 So.2d 828 (1968) ; State v. Angelo, 251
La. 250, 203 So.2d 710 (1967) ; State v. Brown, 250 La. 1023, 201 So.2d 277 (1967).
88. 253 La. 101, nJ, 216 So.2d 828, n.1 (1968).
89. See Section, VII (A) (2) supra.
90. Williams v. Commonwealth, 350 Mass. 732, 216 N.E.2d 779 (1966).
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reviewing the conviction, the Michigan Supreme Court found the felony-
misdemeanor distinction invalid: 9
It might be urged that the apparent distinction made in 18
U.S.C. § 3006A(b) ... between a felony or misdemeanor, on
the one hand, and a "petty offense" has application [and]
should be adopted by this Court .... Scarcely can it be said,
however, that a permissible maximum sentence of 3 months'
imprisonment or $100 fine or both leaves the offense one to be
regarded as so petty as not entitling the indigent accused to the
assistance of counsel. His liberty is involved and in jeopardy.
92
However, "criminal cases" in Michigan apparently do not include or-
dinance violations."
8. MINNESOTA
The rule established by the Minnesota Supreme Court in its
sweeping decision in State v. Borst, is that "counsel should be provided
in any case, whether it be a misdemeanor or not, which may lead to in-
carceration in a penal institution."" Subsequent Minnesota cases have
adhered to this ruling. 5 The Borst court said:
[R]ationalize as we will, it is simply impossible to draw a
distinction between the right to counsel in misdemeanor. .. and
felony cases merely because they are called by different
names. . . .A defendant in court on a charge defined as a
misdemeanor is as helpless to defend himself as he would be if
he were charged with a ... felony. While a misdemeanor under
our laws ... may not exceed 90 days in jail . . . it nonetheless
is a deprivation of liberty .... [W] e decide that counsel should
be provided in any case ... which may lead to incarceration in
a penal institution."
The court left for the future the question of whether counsel should be
provided where only a fine would be imposed.97
9. MISSISSipPI
In a civil rights class action brought on behalf of indigent juveniles
who were charged with delinquency or misdemeanors and tried without
91. People v. Mallory, 378 Mich. 538, 147 N.W.2d 66 (1967).
92. Id. at, 559, 147 N.W.2d at 72.
93. Id.
94. State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 397, 154 N.W.2d 888, 894 (1967).
95. State v. Collins, 278 Minn. 437, 154 N.W.2d 688 (1967); State v. Illingworth, 278
Minn. 434, 154 N.W.2d 687 (1967).
96. State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 397, 154 N.W.2d 888, 893-94 (1967).
97. Id. But see Westberry v. Keith, 434 F.2d 623 (5th Cir. 1970), wherein the court found
no basis to grant a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1964) to one who was
merely fined and whose driver's license was revoked. In this case, petitioner had alleged that
she was denied a court-appointed attorney.
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counsel, a Mississippi federal court held that the sixth amendment right
to counsel had been applied by the fifth circuit "to misdemeanors as well
as to felonies.""8 The district court said that Harvey v. Mississippi, 340
F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965), stood for the proposition that counsel should
be afforded absolutely to all those accused-including indigent misde-
meanants. The court went on to say that Mississippi's failure to provide
compensation to lawyers who represent those accused of non-felonies was
of no consequence to the federal rights. Constitutional rights, the court
said, must nevertheless be upheld.9  The holding of this district court
probably goes further than the fifth circuit's rule.
10. NEW JERSEY
The privilege of appointed counsel has been held applicable to all
criminal trials in New Jersey. Where a citizen's liberty is jeopardized,
the right of assigned counsel exists in municipal courts, in criminal and
quasi-criminal proceedings, and in cases where the defendant is charged
with crimes below the grade of misdemeanor, regardless of the fact that
these kinds of proceedings are handled in a summary fashion.1'0
11. NEW YORK
The opportunity to have the services of a lawyer is a right available
to indigents charged with any crime which is tried in any New York
court.' ' In People v. Witenski, where the defendant was convicted of a
$2 theft and jailed for only a few days, the court held that defendant's
right to counsel was violated by the failure to notify him of his right
to assigned counsel if he could not afford to hire a lawyer."02 However,
New York courts with jurisdiction over traffic offenses have no duty to
inform the accused of a right to counsel nor provide court-appointed
counsel for an indigent. The court, in People v. Letterio, said:
[E]ven the Federal courts recognize the possibility of a rule
limiting the implementation of the right to counsel in the
prosecution of petty offenses....
There are, historically, certain minor transgressions which
admit of summary disposition. New York has long deemed
traffic infractions as a form of misconduct distinguishable from
more serious breaches....
We point out that the practical result of assigning counsel
to defendants . . . in but 1% of these millions of cases could
98. Phillips v. Cole, 298 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Miss. 1968).
99. Id. at 1053.
100. Cf. In re Garofone, 80 N.J. Super. 259, 193 A.2d 398 (1963).
101. Cf. People v. Witenski, 15 N.Y.2d 392, 207 N.E.2d 358, 259 N.Y.S.2d 413 (1965);
People v. Banner, 5 N.Y.2d 109, 154 N.E.2d 553, 180 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1958) ; People v.
Marincic, 2 N.Y.2d 181, 139 N.E.2d 529 (1957); People v. McLaughlin, 291 N.Y. 480, 53
N.E.2d 356 (1944).
102. 15 N.Y.2d 392, 207 N.E.24 358, 259 N.Y.S.2d 413 (1965),
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require the services of nearly half the attorneys registered in
this state.103
However, the dissent in Letterio could not find a rational distinction
between a petty theft case where the defendant may be jailed for a few
days and a traffic offense where the penalty may be far greater.'
12. NORTH CAROLINA
We do not conceive it to be the absolute right of a
defendant charged with a misdemeanor, petty or otherwise, to
have court-appointed and paid counsel ....
The Statute ... leaves the matter to the sound discretion
of the presiding judge. Some misdemeanors and some circum-
stances might justify the appointment of counsel, but this is not
true in all misdemeanors.105
This rule was enunciated by the North Carolina Supreme Court in 1966.
It was built upon and refined by subsequent decisions. In 1969, a state
appellate court held that a defendant charged with a misdemeanor
amounting to a "serious offense" has a constitutional right to the assistance
of counsel during his trial.108 A "serious offense" was defined as one for
which the authorized punishment exceeds six months or a $500 fine.'
Since then the "serious offense" six-month rule has been the law of North
Carolina with respect to the right to appointed counsel." 8
13. oHIo
The accused, in City of Toledo v. Frazier, was convicted without the
aid of counsel of operating a motor vehicle without a license, an ordinance
violation considered a misdemeanor. The Ohio court held that the
misdemeanant did not have a right to be apprised of his right to be
represented by counsel and to have a counsellor appointed if he could not
afford to hire a lawyer. 09 The court said:
It is our considered judgment that the law of Ohio [not re-
quiring appointed counsel in non-felonies] should be followed
in this state until a mandate comes from the Supreme Court of
the United States that the concept of the right to counsel . . .
103. 16 N.Y.2d 307, 213 N.E.2d 670, 266 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1965).
104. Id.
105. State v. Bennett, 266 N.C. 755, 756, 147 S.E.2d 237, 238 (1966). See State v.
Morris, 275 N.C. 50, 165 S.E.2d 245 (1969) ; State v. McCrowe, 272 N.C. 523, 158 S.E.2d
337 (1968) ; State v. Sherron, 268 N.C. 694, 151 S.E.2d 599 (1966) ; State v. Sims, 5 N.C.
App. 288, 168 S.E.2d 238 (1969); State v. White, 3 N.C. App. 31, 164 S.E.2d 36 (1968).
106. State v. Sims, 5 N.C. App. 288, 168 S.E.2d 238 (1969).
107. d.
108. Cf. State v. Morris, 275 N.C. 50, 165 S.E.2d 245 (1969); State v. Green, 8 N.C.
App. 234, 174 S.E.2d 8 (1970); State v. McClam, 7 N.C. App. 477, 173 S.E.2d 53 (1970);
State v. Best, 5 N.C. App. 379, 168 S.E.2d 433 (1969).
109. 10 Ohio App. 2d 51, 226 N.E.2d 77 (1967).
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should be embraced within the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . thereby coercing the legislature
of Ohio... or the courts.., to furnish defendants in misdemea-
nor cases with counsel at public expense.110
14. OREGON
Misdemeanants who are indigent are entitled to appointed counsel
in Oregon. Finding that the estimated expense of providing counsel for
indigent misdemeanants would not be burdensome, the Oregon Supreme
Court ruled in Application of Stevenson
that no person may be deprived of his liberty who has been
denied the assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment. This holding is applicable to all criminal prosecu-




The Wisconsin rule is that counsel must be provided whenever the
maximum penalty to which the accused is subject exceeds six months, and
in other cases where the trial court, in its discretion, deems it desirable to
appoint counsel." In computing the time under this rule, if an accused
is charged with multiple misdemeanors, all the penalties must be added
together, and if they, in total, exceed six months or $500, counsel must
be appointed." 8
IN SUMMARY
This admittedly brief excursion through some of the states which
have decided the question of the applicability of the sixth amendment's
right to counsel to those charged with non-felonies demonstrates the
states' divergent and contradictory treatment of this problem. Several
jurisdictions have found that an accused is not entitled to court-ap-
pointed counsel in any misdemeanor case. Other states have held the
contrary. A third, middle ground position has been to afford counsel in
"serious misdemeanors" or in misdemeanors with penalties up to a
certain set time. Another approach is to construe traffic cases, for
example, as non-criminal, and thus take them outside the right to
counsel rule.1'4
110. Id. at 60, 226 N.E.2d at 783.
111. 254 Ore. 195, 198, 458 P.2d 414, 418 (1969).
112. State ex rel. Plutshack v. State, 37 Wis.2d 713, 155 N.W.2d 549 (1968). See Melvin
v. Burke, Case No. 63-C-52 (E.D. Wis. 1963); State ex rel. Barth v. Burke, 24 Wis.2d 82,
128 N.W.2d 422 (1964).
113. State ex rel. Plutshack v. State, 37 Wis.2d 713, 155 N.W.2d 549 (1968). The
manner in which time is computed is comparable to the fifth circuit's method. See e.g.,
Matthews v. Florida, 422 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1970).
114. See State ex rel. Plutshack v. State, 37 Wis.2d 713, 722, 155 N.W.2d 549, 52 (1968).
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The American Bar Association's Project on Minimum Standards for
Criminal Justice recommended that counsel be provided in all pro-
ceedings punishable by a loss of liberty, regardless of their classification
as misdemeanors, felonies or otherwise." 5 The 1967 Presidential Com-
mission Report on Crime suggested that counsel be appointed for in-
digents in all misdemeanors-except "traffic and similar petty charges.""' 6
Regardless of which approach one may consider appropriate, a
discrepancy exists between the states. The result is that an individual
may be accorded the federal constitutional right in one state and be
denied that right in another."' Of course, lack of uniformity-especially
considering the nature of her federal system-is not inherently bad, but
the basic rights of the United States Constitution should be applied
consistently throughout the nation.
VIII. A PROBLEM IN FEDERALISM-FLORIDA VS. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
The Florida Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit are at loggerheads over the issue of a non-felon's
right to counsel. Regardless of the Fifth Circuit's holdings, Florida has
drawn its own rule.
In 1964, the Supreme Court of Florida pronounced a felony-mis-
demeanor rule for its state; counsel would be provided for accused in-
digents charged with felonies, but not for those accused of non-fel-
onies." 8 The court based its holding upon the intent of the state's
legislature in providing funds for appointed counsel in felony cases, but
not in misdemeanor proceedings. Furthermore, the court found nothing
in the Gideon decision requiring appointment of counsel in all cases."'
In the following year, the Fifth Circuit held in Harvey v. Mississippi
that the sixth amendment right to counsel would be accorded to mis-
demeanants-at least to those misdemeanants subject to 90 days or more
in jail.11°
Then, shortly after the Fifth Circuit's holding in Harvey, the issue
was again presented to the Florida Supreme Court. It held, in Watkins
v. Morris, that an indigent traffic offender was not entitled to court-ap-
pointed counsel.' 21 The court was aware of the fifth circuit's contrary
holding, for it said:
[W]e do not overlook Harvey v. State of Mississippi ...
However, until authoritatively determined to the contrary by
the Supreme Court of the United States, the rule in Florida is
115. ABA, PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4.11 (1967).
116. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
CHALLENGE or CRIME IN A FREE SoCIETY (1967).
117. See Winters v. Beck, 358 U.S. 907 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
118. Fish v. State, 159 So.2d 866 (Fla. 1964).
119. Id.
120. 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965). See section VII (A) (2) supra,
121, Watkins v. Morris, 179 So.2d 348 (Fla. 1965),
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that there is no absolute organic right to counsel in misde-
meanor trials.
22
Then, in apparent hope that the Florida court would change its position,
the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied
a petition for habeas corpus, which alleged that the indigent petitioner
had been denied counsel on the ground that the petitioner had failed to
exhaust available state remedies, a prerequisite to petitioning the federal
court for the writ under 28 U.S.C. section 2254.23 This holding required
the petitioner to go to the state appellate courts and present this issue
there before petitioning the federal court. The petitioner had urged that
this should not be required of him, in view of the pronouncements of the
Florida Supreme Court, because it would be a futile exercise. The federal
court reasoned, however, that the 1967 Supreme Court juvenile due pro-
cess case, In re Gault, could cause the Florida court to change its position.
In the light of the Gault decision ... this Court cannot predict
what the Florida Courts will do when again confronted with the
problem in the instant case. Thus it cannot be said that peti-
tioner has exhausted.., state remedies. 4
His petition denied, petitioner Brinson appealed his cause to the Florida
district court of appeal, which affirmed the conviction on the basis of the
prior Florida decisions, Fish v. State and Watkins v. Morris.'25 So, Brin-
son again petitioned the federal district court, which granted his petition.
Brinson v. Florida, 273 F. Supp. 840 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
The Florida Supreme Court, meanwhile, reaffirmed its position, de-
nying the right to counsel in all misdemeanor cases, in Taylor v. Warden
of Orange County Prison Farms." But, in spite of this, late in 1968,
Judge Brown, Chief Judge of the Fifth Circuit in reversing the federal
district court, said:
Too much has gone over the dam in this flood stage dynamic
development of overriding constitutional restrictions on state
prosecution of criminal charges for us to assume that the Florida
Supreme Court will perversely adhere to their decisions, recent
as they are. Considering the deference and respect the Florida
Supreme Court pays to our decisions in areas of federal . . .
law, we cannot assume that Florida courts will ignore the impact
of our recent decisions . . . [which] postdate the Florida de-
cisions [Goslin v. Thomas, 400 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1968);
McDonald v. Moore, 353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965)].... [W]e
122. Id. at 349.
123. Brinson v. Florida, 269 F. Supp. 747 (S.D. Fla. 1967). Subsequently, the case was
decided on its merits, and the petitioner was granted his petition. Brinson v. Florida, 273 F.
Supp. 840 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
124. Brinson v. Florida, 269 F. Supp. 747, 748 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
125. Brinson v. Purdy, 201 So.2d 260 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
126. 193 So.2d 606 (Fla. 1967),
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cannot conclude what their judgment would be today on an
issue of fundamental justice in such a rapidly developing area. 27
Less than a year after this vote of confidence from Judge Brown, a
Florida federal district court observed in Steadman v. Duff:
128
[I]t is apparent that no relief will be forthcoming from the
Florida supreme court in the near future. ... Comity must oper-
ate both ways, and the Florida courts have consistently refused
to recognize the repeated federal mandates of the Fifth Circuit.
Here the traditional presumption that state courts will protect
constitutional rights in good faith has been overcome....
The time-honored principle of federalism cannot be made a
shield to protect state courts reluctant to accept federal de-
cisions. 2 9
That an "impasse" existed between the state courts of Florida and the
federal courts sitting in Florida and the Fifth Circuit was also recognized
by the circuit court in Colon v. Hendry.'
Finally, in 1970, the Florida Supreme Court reconsidered its position
and adopted a new rule, i.e., that the right to court-appointed counsel
should be extended to non-felonies punishable by more than six months
imprisonment. 3 ' The court's reluctance in making this decision is shown
by the following language:
[W]e are by no means persuaded that the position we took in
Fish, and the reasoning upon which it was based, are no longer
valid.
But our conclusion in this respect does nothing to extricate
the trial courts of this state from the horns of the dilemma in
which they now find themselves. On the one hand is the decision
of this court in Fish affirming a lower court which had denied a
court-appointed counsel to indigent misdemeanants; and on the
other hand are the Fifth Circuit federal courts-both trial and
appellate-that with the aid of the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments and the writ of habeas corpus are coercing our
state courts in decisions that are as distinguished for their lack
of uniformity as for their lack of sound precedent, insofar as
the applicability of Gideon v. Wainwright ... to state trials of
misdemeanor charges are concerned.1
3 2
127. Boyer v. Orlando, 402 F.2d 966, 967 (5th Cir. 1968). In spite of Boyer, however,
Fifth Circuit panels continued to rule on right to counsel cases. Cf. Bohr v. Purdy, 412
F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1969) ; James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Colon v. Hendry,
408 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1969).
128. 302 F. Supp. 313 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
129. Id. at 315-16. See Colon v. Hendry, 408 F.2d 864, 865 (5th Cir. 1969); Wooley v.
Consolidated City of Jacksonville, 308 F. Supp. 1194, 1195 (M.D. Fla. 1970); Mitchell v.
Wainwright, 308 F. Supp. 436 (M.D. Fla. 1969); Bramlett v. Peterson, 307 F. Supp. 1311
(M.D. Fla. 1969). See generally Note, Gideon, Escobedo, Miranda: Begrudging Acceptance
of the United States Supreme Court's Mandates in Florida, 21 U. FiA. L. REv. 346 (1969).
130. 408 F.2d 846, 865 (5th Cir. 1969).
131. State ex rel. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 236 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1970).
132. Id. at 443.
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For direction in reaching this decision, the court looked to and adopted
the six-month rule established in right-to-trial-by-jury cases 3' and Judge
Mehrtens' decision in Brinson v. Florida.
134
The federal courts sitting in Florida and the Fifth Circuit appear to
be rushing ahead to an absolute Gideon rule, and the new Florida six-
month rule, out-of-step and contrary to the federal rule when it was
adopted, may become obsolete.
In October, 1970, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court decision
which applied the sixth amendment's right to counsel to accused indigents
whose total potential penalty is ninety days or more. 135 And, in that same
month, Judge Eaton of the Southern District Court of Florida held that
"any deprivation of liberty without counsel runs afoul of the Constitu-
tion.")
386
At this writing, no one is sure what the rule of the Fifth Circuit is. As
Judge Eaton said, in his recent decision, "although no case in this circuit
has extended the right to counsel to prosecutions that carried a total po-
tential penalty . . . of less than ninety days, no case has established that
there is a ninety day 'dividing line'.... ."13" On the other hand, as already
noted, the Fifth Circuit has established rules for computing maximum
sentences, an unnecessary act if the right to counsel will eventually be
accorded to all those susceptible to incarceration. Thus, it may be that the
rule will eventually be something less than absolute. 8
IX. COLLATERAL ATTACKS ON PAROLE REVOCATIONS AND
ON ENHANCED PUNISHMENTS FOR SECOND OFFENDERS
Two related problems have arisen with regard to the right to counsel
in non-felony cases: (1) a parolee whose parole has been revoked because
of a misdemeanor conviction in which he was not afforded counsel may be
able to collaterally attack the revocation; and (2) second and third of-
fenders who are susceptible to enhanced punishments because of their
prior convictions may be able to collaterally attack any additional pun-
ishment given on this basis if the earlier convictions were obtained with-
out according the defendant a lawyer's aid.
Where it could not be determined whether the defendant was rep-
resented by counsel in prior felony convictions, the United States Supreme
Court reversed a Texas court which had increased the defendant's punish-
ment under the Texas recidivist statute. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109
(1967). Citing this case, the Arizona Supreme Court held that a prior
conviction for a petty crime, where the accused was unrepresented, could
133. See note 31 supra.
134. 273 F. Supp. 840 (S.D. Fla. 1967). See p. 471 supra.
135. Wooley v. Consolidated City of Jacksonville, 433 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'g,
308 F. Supp. 1194 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
136. Patterson v. Purdy, Case No. 69-957-Civ-JE (S.D. Fla., filed Oct. 1, 1970).
137. Id. at 3.
138. Shepherd v. Jordan, 425 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1970) ; Matthews v. Florida, 422 F.2d
1046 (Sth Cir. 1970).
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not be used to increase the punishment for a new petty charge, because
the new petty offense would then become a "serious offense," '' and, in
Arizona, Gideon applies to "serious offenses."' 4
On the other hand, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held:
[T]he validity of former misdemeanor convictions cannot be
collaterally attacked in a proceeding for additional punishment
under the repeater statute on a subsequent misdemeanor con-
viction for the reason that the former convictions are valid until
reversed....
Whether or not prior misdemeanor convictions are proce-
durally antiseptic in no way affects the fact that prior contact
with the criminal law has not prevented subsequent violations.14'
Furthermore, parole revocation may be collaterally attacked by a
parolee, whose parole has been revoked on the sole basis of a misdemeanor
conviction where he was not afforded court-appointed counsel and could
not afford to hire his own lawyer. A number of recent cases have vacated
parole revocations on this basis." 2
X. CONCLUSION
This writer agrees with those who argue that the right to have the
aid of a lawyer must be given to all who may suffer the indignities of
incarceration. This is not to say that those who are guilty should go un-
punished, but that those accused of crimes for which valid defenses exist
should have the opportunity to present these defenses. As Justice Suther-
land said in Powell v. Alabama: 14
3
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and some-
times no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is
incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the
indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of
evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial
without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent ev-
idence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmis-
sible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to
prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He
requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceed-
ings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces
the danger of conviction because he does not know how to es-
tablish his innocence.
139. State v. Reagen, 103 Ariz. 287, 440 P.2d 907 (1968).
140. Cf. State v. Anderson, 96 Ariz. 123, 392 P.2d 784 (1964).
141. State ex rel. Plutshack v. State Dept. of Health & Soc. Services, 37 Wis. 2d 713, 726,
155 N.W.2d 549, 556 (1968).
142. Sapp v. Wainwright, 433 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1970); Brantley v. Wainwright, Case
No. 70-84-Civ-J (M.D. Fla., filed May 5, 1970); Mitchell v. Wainwright, 308 F. Supp. 436
(M.D. Fla. 1969); Brown v. Wainwright, Case No. 68-189-Civ-J (M.D. Fla., filed Aug. 6,
1969) ; People v. Mallory, 378 Mich. 538, 147 N.W.2d 66 (1967).
143. 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
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Recently the United States Supreme Court has observed that "the pros-
pect of imprisonment for however short a time will seldom be viewed by
the accused as a trivial or 'petty' matter and may well result in quite
serious repercussions affecting his career and his reputation.' 44
A decision from the United States Supreme Court is needed to re-
solve this problem. Furthermore, when a lawyer is appointed, he should
be adequately compensated for his work, to assure that he puts forth his
best efforts. Under the Federal Criminal Justice Act, for example, the
appointed lawyer may claim $10 an hour for out-of-court time and $15
an hour for trial time.' 45 On the other hand, the minimum bar fee in Dade
County, Florida, for example, is $40 per hour for attorneys in practice
less than five years.' 6
The Founding Fathers recognized the need to have a lawyer's help
in defending a criminal case. The sixth amendment reads: "In all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right ... to the Assistance of
Counsel for his defense."
The words of Gideon v. Wainwright, however, seem especially ap-
propriate to conclude this article: "[Alny person haled into court, who
is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured of a fair trial unless counsel
is provided for him.' ' 4 7 What lawyer could contend that this is not so?
144. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970).
145. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (1964).
146. DADE COUNTY BAR ASS'N, SCHEDULE OF MiNIMUm FEES 3 (1970).
147. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
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